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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j).
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the dismissal of Appellant's Declaratory
Judgment action and U.R.C.P. 60(b) action for relief from judgment,
rejecting Petitioner's claim the Utah divorce laws to be declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel v.
Granville was proper. Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no
material issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law, and is reviewed under a "correction
of

error"

standard

without

deference

to

the

trial

Court's

determination. Malibu Investment Corp. v. Sparks, 2000 Ut. 30 § 12
996 P.2d 104; Larsen v. Park City Mun. Corp. 955 P.2d 343 (Ut.
1998); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Ut. 1994)

(R. 85-103; R. 123-

136; R. 151-155; R. 156-162; R. 276, Tr. July 30, 2001, P. 41-44)
2.

Whether

granting

Respondent's

Motion

for

Rule

11

Sanctions, awarding attorney's fees and costs to Respondent by the
trial Court was proper in view of Petitioner's attempt to
1

re-litigate by his declaratory action, issues and matters of the
prior divorce action that had been ruled upon, denied on Appeals,
and were res judicata, is reviewed under a "correction of error"
standard.

Clark v. Deloitte, 34 P.3d 209 (S 2001)

(R. 45-48; R.

49-57; R. 59-70; R. 71-79; R. 276, Tr. 15; Tr. 41-44 July 30, 2001)
3.

The trial Court's denial of Petitioner's Motion to Alter

or Amend Judgment, Rule 59(e) U.R.C.P. was proper and is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.
P.2d 491 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)

Hudema v. Carpenter, 989

(R. 187-205; R. 206-225; R. 226-229;

Tr. Oct. 15, 2001 P. 5-6; P. 8-12; P. 20-24; P. 44-45)
4. Constitutional issues including due process are questions
of law which are reviewed for correctness.

In re S.L.E. 2001, Ut.

App. 183, 27 P.3d 583 (R. 187-189; R. 276, Tr. 42)
III.
CONTROLLING STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
(a)

Utah Code Annotated, 78-33-1, et seq., Amended

set forth in the Addendum hereto.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A.

Rule 11, URCP(b)(l) and (2) set forth in Appellant's
Brief; and
(c) Sanctions; (1)(A) and (B) set forth in Appellant's
Brief; and
(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations (A) and (B) set
forth in Appellant's Brief; and
(3) Order. Set forth in Appellant's Brief.
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Rule 12, URCP(b)(6):

HOW PRESENTED.

Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross
claim, or third party claim shall be asserted in the
responsive pleadings thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may, at the option of the
pleader, be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Rule 56, URCP:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion,
memorandum and affidavit shall be filed and served
in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone, although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Rule 59 URCP: NEW TRIAL; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT
(a) GROUNDS. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion
for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
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Court may open the judgment if one has been entered,
take additional testimony, amend findings of fact
and conclusions of law or make new findings and
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the Court,
jury or adverse party or any order of the Court,
or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could not,
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
(c) AFFIDAVITS, TIME FOR FILING. When the
application for a new trial is made under subdivision
(a)(1) . . . or (4) it shall be supported bv affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon
affidavits, they shall be served with the motion.
(Emphasis added)
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND A JUDGMENT.
A motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
RULE 60(b) URCP: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER.
(b) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT;
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the Court may in the
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which, by due diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) Fraud . . .
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) The judgment is void; (5) The judgment has
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) or
(3), not more than three months after the judgment,
4

order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not effect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a Court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding, or to set aside
a judgment for fraud upon the Court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an independent
action. (Emphasis added)

RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
RULE 4-506. WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES
Set forth in Appellant's Brief
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appeal from the Judgment and Order that denied Appellant's
Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment by the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley, entered November 14, 2001.

(R. 261-262; R. 265-266)

The Notice of Appeal did not state Appellant appealed from the
Order and Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, entered October 15,
2001 denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, granting
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the action, and her Rule 11 Motion
awarding attorney's fees and costs to Respondent.
R. 265-266)

5

(R. 244-246;

V.
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a Complaint with the Third District Court,
Case

No.

010901910,

on

or

about

March

5,

2001,

entitled

"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION and URCP 60(b) ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT," challenging the Decree of Divorce rendered by Judge
Sandra N. Peuler, entered on October 22, 1996; and the unpublished
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, November 4, 1999, Case No.
990666 CA, affirming a post Decree Judgment of the lower Court and
denying Appellant's second Appeal from the Decree of Divorce.
(R. 1-2; R. 10-24)
Appellant was represented by Attorney Ronald C. Barker until
his withdrawal in the early stages of the proceedings, March 21,
2001.

Mr. Barker withdrew at the time he was advised Appellee was

filing a Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions that was served by mailing to
Attorney Barker on March 21, 2001, and filed with the Court on
April 12, 2001, after receiving Appellant's response.

(R. 35;

R. 44, 49-57)
Notice to Appoint Counsel was mailed to Appellant on March 23,
2001. (R. 31-32)

Appellant mailed his response to the Motion for

Rule 11 Sanctions to Appellee's attorney on or about April 9, 2001,
but did not file this response with the Court.

(R. 59; R. 71)

Appellee's attorney, assuming that Appellant had filed his response
6

to the Rule 11 Motion with the Court, filed a reply to Appellant's
unfiled response on April 12, 2001 in compliance with Rule
4-501(1)(c) CJA.

(R. 43-48)

Appellant filed his Pro se Notice of

Appearance on April 16, 2001, and filed an Amended Response to the
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, requesting oral argument on April 26,
2001.

(R. 58; R. 59-70)

Appellee filed her Reply to the Amended

Response of Appellant on May 3, 2001. (R. 71-79)
On May 18, 2001, Appellant filed a Motion and Memorandum for
Summary Judgment, requesting oral argument.
Memorandum were filed

in duplicate

Both the Motion and

(R. 85-122; R. 123-150)

Appellee filed her Reply Memorandum in opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment and to dismiss the action of Petitioner on May 24,
2001.

(R. 151-154)

Appellant filed his reply in support of his

Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 2001, with a Notice to
Submit for Decision.

(R. 156-164)

Notice of Oral Argument was mailed by the trial Court to the
respective parties on June 26, 2001. Appellant filed a "Summary of
Proposed Oral Argument" on July 26, 2001, four (4) days before the
scheduled hearing.

The Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions, the Motion

for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss the Declaratory
Action were heard as scheduled by the trial Court on July 30, 2001.
At the conclusion of this hearing, the Court, the Honorable Tyrone
E. Medley, granted the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, denied
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgement, granted Appellee's Motion
7

to Dismiss the Declaratory Action and awarded attorney's fees to
Appellee. (R. 186; R. 238-246)
Appellant filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment on August 7, 2001, before entry of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment

and Order of Dismissal,

pursuant to the July 30, 2001 hearing.

(R. 187-205; R. 238-246)

(Tr. 227 p. 3) Appellee filed her Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, August 16, 2001.

(R. 225)

Appellant filed his Reply in support of the Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment on August 23, 2001, together with duplicate Notice
to Submit for Decision.

(R. 226-233)

Hearing on Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was
held on October 15, 2001, pursuant to notice from the Court mailed
to the respective parties.

(R. 236-237) The Court, after hearing,

denied Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, awarding
additional attorney's fees to the Appellee in connection with
Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (R. 250-263)
The Notice of Appeal was filed on December 14, 2001, from the
Final Judgment of November 14, 2001 that denied Appellant's Rule
59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment giving rise to the question
that this Appeal is limited to that Judgment and Order. (R. 261263; R. 265)
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VI.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant, by the Complaint filed in this action entitled

"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION and URCP 60(b) ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT," attempted to re-litigate the prior divorce action, Case
No. 954904707, that he had appealed twice to the Utah Court of
Appeals and the denials of those Appeals (R. 1-24).
2. Appellant, by virtue of URCP 60(b) sought to challenge the
Decree of Divorce, a third time, four (4) years after entry on
October 22, 1996, and the unpublished decision of this Court, Case
No. 99066 CA (1999 Ut. App. 312), after the denial of the Appeals
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the denials of his Petitions for
Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court that were matters of Court record before commencement of this
action. (R.22-30; R.49-57)
(a) The Decree of Divorce entered by the Third
District Court, appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals
by Petitioner on November 7, 1996, Case No. 960720 CA,
was affirmed by decision of the Court of Appeals
September 25, 1997.
(b) The Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Utah Supreme Court from the decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals filed by Petitioner on November 14, 1997,
Case No. 97054-SC was denied on February 26, 1998.
(c) The Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the
Utah Supreme Court filed by Petitioner on December 12,
1997, Case No. 970586 was denied January 14, 1998,
together with the request for hearing.
(d)

The second Appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
9

from the divorce action that included a constitutional
challenge to the Utah divorce statutes, Case No. 990666-CA,
was denied November 4, 1999. (R. 3; R. 22-23; R. 45)
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme
Court was denied. (R. 3; R. 26)
(e) Appellant filed three (3) separate Petitions
for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. All were denied, to-wit:
(i) The first Petition filed on April 9,
1998, Docket No. 97-1677 from the denial of the
first Appeal of the Divorce Decree presented for
review the question; "Do State Court's violate
the 14th Amendment to United States Constitution
when they deny us the opportunity to preserve
our marriage?" This Petition was denied on June
22, 1998. (R. 56)
(ii) The second Petition filed on May 15,
1999, Docket No. 97-1848, from the denial of the
first Appeal of the Divorce Decree and the Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court
presented for review the question; "By adding
irreconcilable difference to divorce statutes,
the States have created a no-fault divorce trend
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
As a matter first impression, are spouses provided
adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden? Is
it drawn so imprecisely that it encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law?
Is it so broad that it sanctions conduct which
States are not entitled to regulate or ensnare
couples whose marriages can be preserved? Does it
extend the State's police power beyond their
compelling interest, deny procedural due process
and threaten fundamental and express constitutional
rights?" (emphasis added) This Petition was denied on
October 5, 1998. (R. 57)
(iii) The third Petition filed on June 5,
2000, Docket No. 99-1997, from the granting of
Summary Disposition of the second Appeal of the
Divorce Decree to the Utah Court of Appeals
presented for review the questions:
(1) "In light of Troxel v. Granville,
(decided June 5, 2000) whether 30-3-5 of
Utah Code impairs the role of fit parents
10

in family decisions beyond constitutional
limits?"
(2) "Whether parental and property
protection of the Bill of Rights and 14th
Amendment are pre-empted by State's
interest in the marital status?"
(3) "Article III of the Utah Constitution
creates unique Federal property/religion right
that "shall be irrevocable without the consent
of the United States." (subparagraphs omitted)
(4) "Whether determination of constitutionality
of the statute by the Utah Court of Appeals,
after silencing the father by eliminating briefing,
hearing transcripts and argument, violates due
process and First Amendment protection of free
speech and "to the Petition to the Government?"
This Petition was denied October 2, 2000. (R. 3; R. 28)
(See Addendum #1)
3.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel

v. Granville, that affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court's
decision declaring Washington Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) Third Party
Visitation statute unconstitutional, addressed visitation rights of
third parties and grandparents and did not encompass the Washington
divorce statutes.

The trial Court, Judge Medley, concluded that

res

a bar

judicata

was

and

precluded

Appellant's

declaratory

action, "in that the issues presented, for the most part, have been
previously resolved.

That a reasonable interpretation of the

decision in Troxel would not have the broad application suggested
by Mr. Joos, that all of the divorce laws of the State of Utah are
unconstitutional."
4.

(Tr. 266 p.41-42)

The related Petition for Writ of Certiorari referenced in

11

Appellants Brief under the heading "STATEMENT OF FACTS" paragraph
7 at page 20, was denied by order of the Utah Supreme Court
effective September 17, 2002, and a Petition for rehearing was
rejected on October 2, 2002.
5.

Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

was not supported by Affidavit and attempted to introduce new
issues

and

discovered.

evidence

not

previously

presented

and

not

newly

The hearsay statements were objected to by Appellee.

(R. 187-205; R. 206-225; Tr. 227 p. 20-21)

Judge Medley denied

the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on the basis and finding,
"the Motion to be wholly insufficient, that the prior ruling of the
Court was not error and Mr. Joos was not denied any of his due
process rights."

Appellee was awarded additional attorney's fees

consistent with Utah Code Section 78-33-10.

(R. 227, Tr. p. 45)

(See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marchant. 615 P.2d 423 (Ut. 1980)
In his Brief, Appellant has made contradictory or misleading
statements, together with an unsupported statement regarding the
withdrawal of his attorney, Mr. Barker.
Appellant's

Brief pg. 38-39)

(R. 43-48; R. 59; R. 215;

The cases cited by Appellant,

Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey; K.S and K.S. v. S.H. and G. .H. ; State ex
rel S.A. are clearly distinguishable from this case having little
or no application.

The majority of quotes from these cases are

taken out of context.
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VII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Appellant was not entitled to a judgment as a mater of law
and denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was not
error. Dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment action was proper and
not error on the basis and finding that the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville did not overrule the prior
decision of this Court on the second Appeal of the divorce action
and

did

not

declare

the

Utah

divorce

statutes

to

be

unconstitutional. (R. 226 Tr. p. 41-42) Appellant's third Petition
to the U.S. Supreme Court for Certiorari based on Troxel was
denied.

An intelligent reading of the U.S. Supreme Court decision

in Troxel clearly refutes Petitioner's claim that this decision
renders unconstitutional Titles 30 and 78 of the Utah Code and
establishes his claim to be without merit. The U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Troxel is limited to the rights of parents vs. rights
of third parties to visitation with children in the control of
parents or guardians, not as between divorced parents.
R. 99(4); R. 101-102(8); R. 239-243)

(R. 75-78;

The U.S. Supreme Court,

finding no basis for a remand, limited its decision to the Court's
application of the Washington statute and recognized the burden of
continuing litigation and the cost incurred to Granville. (R. 103)
Appellant's continuing litigation is an unwarranted burden to
Appellee and the Courts.
13

2.

Res Judicata is a bar to Appellant's declaratory action.

Appellant's URCP Rule 60(b) action seeking relief from the Decree
of Divorce and the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, November
4, 1999, is barred by Res Judicata and laches in view of the
subsequent denials of the Petitions for Writs of Certiorari to the
Utah Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court outlined in the
pleadings on file and the Statement of Facts herein.

(R. 22-30;

R. 55-57; R. 123-125; R. 226 Tr. p.41-42)
3.

Pursuant to Rule 11 URCP, the Summons and Complaint in

this action, signed by Appellant's attorney, Ronald C. Barker, an
experienced attorney, represents and certifies to the Court, based
on his knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry that this action was not brought to harass or increase the
cost of litigation to Appellee, or that the claims and contentions
of the Appellant are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or renewal of
existing law or the establishment and new law (emphasis added).
Having full knowledge of the denied prior Appeals, Petitions for
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court, Appellant, by this action, attempted to re-litigate
the prior divorce action and matters that had already been decided
and disposed of, in violation of Rule 11(b) (1) & (2) , Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
4.

(R. 49-58)

Appellant, having received the Rule 11 Motion, his

attorney having withdrawn, did not avail himself of the opportunity
14

to withdraw or correct the challenged pleading, pursuant to Rule 11
URCP(c)(1)(A).

(R. 49-57; R. 72)

Appellant continued to pursue

his claims of denial of due process; that the Utah divorce statutes
are unconstitutional; and that the Decree of Divorce and decision
of this Court on the second Appeal of the divorce action to be
overruled by Troxel.

The trial Court found these claims to be

frivolous, warranting the imposition of sanctions.

(R. 58-70; R.

71-79; R. 85-103; R. 226 Tr. p. 43-44)
5. Denial of Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment by the trial Court was not an abuse of discretion or
error. The Motion was not supported by Affidavit and was defective
on

its

face.

Failure

to

comply

with

the

requirements

of

subparagraph

(c) , when the motion is made on the grounds in

subdivisions

(1) and (4) mandating an Affidavit that shall be

served with the Motion was fatal to Appellant's Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment.

Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 95 P.2d 125

(Ut. App. 1997), Cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Ut. 1997); Thorlev v.
Kolob Fish and Game Club, 13 Ut.2d, 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962).
Appellant's claims of denial of due process, bias or prejudice,
nisconduct by the trial judge, and misconduct on the part of
counsel for Appellee, were without merit.

(R. 187-196; R. 206-221;

I. 250-263; R. 277 Tr. p. 45)
6. Contrary to the position of Appellant, Rule 4-506, Code of
udicial Administration, is procedural, not jurisdictional and
ubstantial compliance was not error. Appellant mis-states and/or
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misquotes subparagraph (4) of this Rule.
7.

Appellee is entitled to be awarded attorney's fees and

costs she has incurred incident to this Appeal.

Marshall v.

Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996)
VIII.
ARGUMENT
DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSAL OF THE DECLARATORY ACTION WAS NOT ERROR
AS A MATTER OF LAW
As a general rule, for an Appeal from the Order of July 30,
2001 denying Summary Judgment and dismissing the declaratory action
to be properly raised, the Notice of Appeal, shall designate the
judgment or order appealed from.

(URAP 3(d))

Appellant did not

mention the Order of July 30, 2001 in the Notice of Appeal.
(R. 264)

This requirement is jurisdictional and the Order of July

30, 2001 is not properly before the Court. Jensen v. Intermountain
Power Agency, 1999 Ut. 10 f7, 997 P.2d 474 (citations omitted)
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville
(supra), centered on a Washington State Statute for third Party
(grandparents) visitation with children in control of parents or
guardians, not as between divorced parents and its application by
the Superior Court. Justice O'Connor, writing the majority opinion
that affirmed the Washington State Supreme Court, declared the
broadly worded statute unconstitutional, stating at page 2056:
(b) Washington's breathtakingly broad statute
16

effectively permits a Court to disregard and
overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent
concerning visitation whenever a third party
affected bv the decision files a visitation
petition, based solely on the judge's determination
of the child's best interest. A parent's
estimation of the child's best interest is
accorded no deference. The State Supreme Court
had the opportunity, but declined, to give
§26.10.160(3) a narrower reading. A combination
of several factors compels the conclusion that
S26.10.160(3) as applied here exceeded the bonds
of due process clause . . . . The problem here
is not that the Superior Court intervened, but
that when it did so, it gave no special weight
to Granville's determination of her daughter's
best interest. More importantly, that Court
appears to have applied the opposite presumption,
favoring grandparent visitation. In effect, it
placed on Granville the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in her daughter's best interest
and thus failed to provide any protection for her
fundamental right. The Court also gave no weight
to Granville's having assented to visitation even
before the filing of the petition or subsequent
Court intervention. These factors, when considered
with the Superior Court's slender findings, show
that this case involves nothing more than a simple
disagreement between the Court and Granville concerning
her childrens' best interest and that the visitation
order was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville's
right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her
children (emphasis added)
(c) Because the instant decision rests on
§26.10.160(3)'s sweeping breadth and its application
here, there is no need to consider the question
whether the due process clause requires all
non-parental visitation statutes to include a showing
of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition
precedent to granting visitation or to decide the
precise scope of the parental due process right in
the visitation context. There is also no reason to
remand this case for further proceedings,
(emphasis added)
rhus, the intelligent reading of the Troxel decision clearly
refutes Appellant's claim that this decision rendered the Utah
17

divorce

statutes,

Titles

30

and

78

of

the

Utah

Code

unconstitutional. Appellant has not shown the finding of the trial
Court, "that his action based on Troxel to be frivolous," resulting
in denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment to be an abuse of
discretion or error as a matter of law.

Justice O'Connor went on

to state at page 2064, that the Court agreed with Justice Kennedy:
"We do not, and need not, define today the precise
scope of the parental due process right in the
visitation context. In this respect, we agree with
Justice KENNEDY that the constitutionality of any
standard for awarding visitation turns on the
specific manner in which that standard is applied
and that the constitutional protection in this
area are best "elaborated with care." (Post at 279
dissenting opinion) Because much State-Court
adjudication in this context occurs on a case-bycase basis we would be hesitant to hold that
specific non-parental visitation statutes violate
due process clause as a per se matter. (R. 102)
(citations omitted; emphasis added)
At the time Appellant, Mr. Joos, pursued a direct Appeal from
the Decree of Divorce to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 960720
CA, he did not dispute or contest the order of custody, visitation
or division of property.

(R. 276; Tr.p. 32, 34)

This Appeal

centered on the issue of grounds. It is an admitted fact that Mr.
Joos elected not to contest these issues at trial or the first
Appeal, stating:
"My religion forbids me to be an adversary
to my wife"
Mr. Joos decided to pursue these issues and the constitutional
issues after his former wife remarried by his second Appeal that
was denied.

(R. 22-24; R. 276, Tr. p. 32-36)
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Under these facts

and circumstances, Appellant was not entitled to a Summary Judgment
as a matter of law.
RES JUDICATA IS A BAR TO THE DECLARATORY ACTION
AND THE RULE 60(b) URCP ACTION
As a general rule, the principles of Res Judicata bar
re-litigation of claims that have been previously litigated between
the same parties, or could and should have been raised in the first
action

to

litigation.

promote

judicial

economy

by

preventing

needless

In re J.T.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994)

The

attempt by Appellant, by declaratory action, to pursue the same
issues that had been decided and ruled upon in the divorce action,
not appealed in the first Appeal and denied in the second Appeal by
this Court,

together with the denials

of the

Petitions

for

Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court,
clearly established Res Judicata as a bar to the declaratory and
Rule 60(b) action. (R. 22-29; R. 55-57)
As an undisputed fact, Troxel did not address the divorce
issues of child custody, visitation of parents with their minor
children, child support, health insurance or the division of
property and did not establish new law.

The Troxel Court was

cautious, hesitant and reluctant to give a broad application to its
decision, stating at page 2064:
"Because much State-Court adjudication in this
context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would
be hesitant to hold that specific non-parental
visitation statutes violate the due process clause
19

as a per se matter.
added) (R. 102)

(citations omitted, emphasis

The decision of Judge Medley based upon the procedural history
of this case, including all the appellate decisions, that Res
Judicata is a bar to the declaratory action and at the same time
rejecting the broad application of Troxel suggested by Mr. Joos "as
frivolous" is clearly supported by the facts and record. Denial of
the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissal of the declaratory
action was not error as a matter of law.
Appellant by challenging the ruling of the trial Court with
respect to the denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment, and
dismissal of the declaratory action, together with the denial of
his Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, has failed to
meet his obligation to martial the evidence in support of the
Court's

ruling

and

then

demonstrate

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient when viewed in the light less favorable to the Court's
ruling, warranting denial of this Appeal.
P. 3d

724.

There

is no showing

Neeley v. Bennett, 51

by the Appellant

that the

application of the Utah divorce statutes in his divorce case by the
trial Court violated his constitutional rights or guarantees. Mr.
Joos has been afforded due process and access to the Courts at
every stage of his divorce action from trial through the appellate
process. In view of the several Appeals and the numerous Petitions
seeking review, Mr. Joos is abusing his right of process.
As a matter of law, an action seeking relief from a judgment
20

(Decree of Divorce) under Rule 60(b) URCP must be made within a
reasonable time.

Assuming Rule 60(b) URCP had any application

after denial of the two Appeals, the Petition for Rehearing,
Petitions for Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court, as aforesaid, Mr. Joos filed his separate
action more than four (4) years after entry of the Decree of
Divorce. The Utah Court of Appeals, in an adoption case, Maertz v.
Maertz, 827, P.2d 259 (1992) recognized the need for finality in
adoption proceedings and held:
"That Plaintiffs action brought 3 1/2 years
after the adoption order was granted, was not
brought within a "reasonable time" under subdivision
(b). (emphasis added)
Applying this case rule to Mr. Joos actions seeking relief from the
Decree of Divorce more than four (4) years after entry, after two
Appeals and the denial of the various Petitions, in the interest of
finality to divorce action, the defenses of Res Judicata and laches
are applicable to his Rule 60(b) action.

Rule 60(b) URCP was not

available as a "back door" to re-litigate issues or to challenge
the decision of this Court on the second Appeal that had been
resolved by the prior decisions on the Appeals, or that should have
been resolved had they been properly and timely presented and the
denials of the various Petitions as aforesaid.

(See Franklin Covey

Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 Ut. App. 110 P.3d 451)

Res

Judicata is a bar to the declaratory action and the action seeking
relief from the Decree of Divorce under Rule 60(b).
21

APPELLANTS ATTEMPT TO RE-LITIGATE MATTERS
BARRED BY RES JUDICATA VIOLATES RULE 11 URCP
Appellant's

attorney,

Ronald

C.

Barker,

an

experienced

attorney, by signing the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment action
represented and certified to the Court, based on his knowledge and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, that the action was not
brought to harass or increase the cost to Appellee. Mr. Barker, by
signing the Complaint, also represented and certified to the Court
that the claims and contentions of Mr. Joos to be warranted by
existing law or to be a non-frivolous argument for the modification
of existing law or the establishment of new law. Being reminded of
the second Appeal of the divorce by Mr. Joos to the Utah Court of
Appeals that raised the same constitutional
advised

of

the

denials

of

the

Petitions

issues and being
for Rehearing

for

Certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court,
and that Appellee deemed the declaratory action a violation of Rule
11 URCP, Mr. Barker mailed his Withdrawal of Counsel on March 21,
2001, the same day that the Rule 11 Motion requesting sanctions was
mailed to Mr. Barker.

(R. 35; R. 49-57)

As an undisputed fact, Troxel clearly did not encompass the
Washington divorce statutes and did not address the issues of
custody of minor children, child support, division of property or
health insurance and did not establish new law..

It is an

admitted fact, that Mr. Joos did not contest the Order and Decree
of Divorce on these issues at the time of the divorce trial or by
22

his first Appeal from the Decree of Divorce to this Court.
Further, Mr. Barker and Mr. Joos had actual knowledge of the
decision of this Court on the second Appeal that summarily affirmed
the post Decree Order and Judgment of the trial Court and denied
Mr. Joos' unconstitutional claims. (R.2; R. 22-23)

That decision

filed November 4, 1999 (1999 Ut. App. 312) determined Mr. Joos
challenge to the distribution of private property to be barred by
res judicata.

His effort to modify child custody and visitation

was to be raised by a proper petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce.

Mr. Joos' claim

that

the

District

Court

lacked

"constitutional jurisdiction" over the parties divorce proceedings,
together with his claim the Utah divorce statutes relating to
children,

property,

debts or obligations

of the parties and

granting continuing jurisdiction over these subjects, discriminate
against marriage persons, are vague, over broad and violate equal
protection guarantee were found by this Court to be without merit
and rejected.

(R. 22-23)

Under these circumstances, coupled with

the knowledge of the denials of the various Petitions to the Utah
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court, the filing of the
declaratory action constituted abuse of process and harassment of
Appellee, a violation of Rule 11(b)(1).

The argument advanced by

Appellant that Troxel overruled the decision of this Court (Case
No. 990666CA) rendering the Utah divorce statutes unconstitutional
violated Rule 11(b)(2). This argument was frivolous and is refuted
by an intelligent reading of the Troxel decision.
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Mr. Joos, nor his attorney, Mr. Barker, availed themselves of
the opportunity to withdraw or correct the challenge pleadings
under Rule

11(c)(1)(A).

Mr. Joos, after withdrawal

of his

attorney, continued to pursue the claims barred by res judicata and
his frivolous argument that Troxel overruled the decision of this
Court

and

declared

the

Utah

divorce

statutes

to

be

unconstitutional, warranting the trial Court granting the Rule 11
Motion and imposing sanctions by awarding attorney's fees and costs
to Appellee.
DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT WAS NOT ERROR
Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
alleging irregularity in the proceedings by the adverse party and
the Court, to-wit: misconduct of counsel, denial of due process,
violation of Rule 4-506(4) CJA, judicial misconduct and bias, was
not supported by the required affidavit, or the record and was
without merit, warranting denial by the trial Court. Hart v. Salt
Lake County Commission (supra)

Appellant's attempt to introduce

new issues and evidence without the required affidavit mandated by
Rule 59(c), rendered the Motion defective on its face. The Motion
being wholly insufficient, the denial of the Motion by the trial
Court was not abuse of discretion or error.
and Game Club (supra) .

Thorley v. Kolob Fish

The transcripts of both hearings (R. 276-

277) preponderate against Appellant and favors denial of the Motion
24

to

Alter

or

Amend

Judgment

by

the

trial

Court

within

its

discretionary authority. Appellant received notice from the Court
more than thirty (30) days before the date set for hearing on his
Motion for Summary Judgment and Appellee's Motions. Appellant did
not object to this notice or the amount of time the trial Court had
reserved for hearing on the respective Motions. During Appellant's
presentation, the Court requested that Mr. Joos address his most
important point to show how Troxel applied to the Utah divorce
laws,

and why

res judicata

does not

apply,

and

respond to

Respondent's Rule 11 Motion and Motion to Dismiss. (R. 276, Tr. p.
14-17; 38)

Appellant did not follow the Court's instruction and

did not adequately respond.

(R. 276)

Appellant's claim of prejudicial misconduct by the Court was
without substance or merit.
were conducted

The proceedings held July 30, 2001

in a proper, dignified

and orderly manner in

compliance with Canon 3, subparagraphs (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8),
:ode of Judicial Conduct.

Judge Medley performed his judicial

iuties without bias or prejudice.
rords or conduct
eligion.

amounting

There was no manifestation by

to bias

or prejudice based

upon

It was not bias or prejudice for the Court to restrict

rgument and presentation to the Motions and issues that were
efore the Court.
o claim

that

It was a contradiction on the part of Appellant

the Court,

by

rendering

its decision

at the

Dnclusion of the hearing in compliance with Canon 3, subparagraph
i) to be denial of due process evidencing bias of the Court.
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Appellant's religious beliefs were not an issue in the proceedings
until he interjected his religious belief at the close of his
presentation with regard to the original divorce action.
Medley

was

prepared

to

make

his

ruling

before

Judge

Appellant's

unexpected comment regarding his religious beliefs and the response
of Respondent's counsel.

Neither influenced or had any bearing on

the decision of the Court.

The response by Respondent's counsel

did not ridicule or belittle Petitioner's belief as he claimed and
characterized.

(R. 276, Tr. p. 40-41)

Appellant's claim of bias

or prejudice appears to be based on the fact of the Court's ruling,
at the conclusion of the hearing, being adverse to him. This alone
does not constitute bias or prejudice.

Absent error, or if an

error occurred, absent a showing that the error was substantial and
prejudicial, that Appellant was deprived in some manner of a full
and fair consideration of the disputed issues, the claim of bias or
prejudice based on the alleged violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct is without factual basis or merit warranting denial of the
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.

Promax Development v. Madsen.

943 P.2d 247 (Ut. App. 1997)
The provisions of Rule 61 URCP is applicable with respect to
Appellant's claim of error. Appellant fails to establish error in
fact, or if there was error, it was not harmless.

Appellant has

not met his burden to show substantial and/or prejudicial error.
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Ut. 1987)
his

obligation

to

marshal 1

the
26

Appellant has not met

evidence

and

to

meet

the

requirements of Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
His Brief, on this issue, contains numerous citations to authority
without development and reasoned analysis based on that authority.
His reliance on Troxel was misplaced and frivolous.

Quotes from

cases cited are taken out of context. The Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment being wholly insufficient, denial was not error.

Also,

Appellant having failed to adequately present his constitutional
arguments warrants denial of this Appeal. (State v. Jaeger f 31 973
P.2d 404 S. Ct. 1999)
RULE 4-506 CJA IS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE NOT ERROR
Appellant takes the position that the trial Court lacked
jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions asserting the Motion to
have been filed during the 20 day prohibition on "PROCEEDINGS."
Under the true facts and circumstances, Appellant's position is
without merit. Rule 4-506 is procedural, not jurisdictional. The
20 day prohibition of subparagraph (4) referred to by Appellant as
:he "safe harbor" applies to the "holding of proceedings by the
Jourt" not the filing of Motions or other pleadings. This Court in
ipporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 Ut. App. 175, 982 P.2d 586, stated:
"Because this Rule compels opposing counsel
to file a required notice and also directs the
trial Court to wait 20 days after that filing before
holding further proceedings, the Court errored by
striking a wife's pleadings and placing her in
default after granting her counsel's Motion to
Withdraw.
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Based on this decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, it is clear
that the 20 day prohibition is against the trial Court "holding
proceedings," not the filing of motions or other pleadings.
Proceedings or legal proceedings is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Edition, at page 1368 as follows:
In a general sense, the form and manner of
conducting judicial business before a court or
judicial officer . . . the term is mainly applicable,
in a legal sense, only to judicial acts before some
judicial tribunal.
The existing facts in this case clearly establish that there was
compliance with Rule 4-506(4) CJA and the filing of the Rule 11
Motion in compliance with Rule 11 URCP was not error.

The Motion

for Rule 11 Sanctions was mailed to Appellant's attorney March 21,
2001, the same day that Mr. Barker signed and mailed his Withdrawal
of Counsel.

The provisions of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides:

A motion for sanctions under this Rule shall
be made separately from other motions or requests
and shall describe the specific conduct alleged
to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served
as provided in Rule 5. but shall not be filed or
presented to the Court unless, within 21 days
after service of the motion (or other such periods
as the Court may prescribe), the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial
is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected,
(emphasis added)
After mailing and service of the Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions on
Mr. Barker on March 21, 2001, Notice to Appoint Counsel was served
by mailing to Appellant on March 23, 2001.

Appellant mailed his

response to the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions to Appellee's attorney
on April 9, 2001.

Unknown to Appellee's attorney, Appellant's
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response was not filed with the Court. Assuming that Appellant had
filed his response to the Rule 11 Motion with the Court, a reply to
Appellant's unfiled response was made on April

12, 2001, in

compliance with Rule 4-501(1)(c) and the Rule 11 Motion was filed
with the Court April 12, 2001, 22 days after service by mail and 3
days after receiving the response of Appellant.

(R. 35; R. 41-42;

R. 43-57) Appellant then filed his Notice of Appearance Pro Se on
April 16, 2001.

(R. 58)

He filed an amended response to the

Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, requesting oral argument on April 26,
2001.

(R. 59-70) Appellee filed her reply to the amended response

of Appellant on May 3, 2001 (R. 71-79). The hearing or proceedings
on the Rule 11 Motion was not held until July 30, 2001, a period of
nore than 4 months after the Notice to Appoint Counsel.

Contrary

;o the assertion and position of Appellant, under the true facts,
.here was compliance with Rule 4-506(4) CJA, and the Court did not
ack jurisdiction with respect to the Rule 11 Motion, to grant the
otion and impose appropriate sanctions.

Contrary to Appellant's

tatement, his attorney, Mr. Barker, did not withdraw for health
masons, but for the reasons set forth in Appellee's Brief.
>pellant's claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction and was barred
Federal and State law, without citing authority, from granting
e Rule 11 Motion and imposing sanctions is without merit.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF
The object of a Notice of Appeal is to advise the opposite
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party that an Appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in the
particular case. For an Appeal of the Order of July 30, 2001 to be
properly raised and to be before this Court, Appellant is required
to designate the judgment or order appealed from. This requirement
is jurisdictional.

The Order and judgment of July 30, 2001 is not

properly before this Court in that Appellant failed to mention this
judgment in the Notice of Appeal.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel did
not overrule the decision of this Court in the second Appeal of the
divorce action and did not declare the Utah divorce statutes to be
unconstitutional.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel is to

be given a narrow application limited to non-parental visitation
statutes.

Under these facts and circumstances, Appellant was not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law and denial of the Motion
for Summary Judgment by the trial Court was proper and not error.
Based on the procedural history of the divorce action, res
judicata was a bar to the declaratory judgment action and Rule
60(b) URCP was not available to Appellant as a "back door" to
re-litigate issues that had been resolved by prior Court decisions
or to challenge the decision of this Court on the second Appeal.
Dismissal of the declaratory judgment action and Rule 60(b) action
for relief from judgment was not error and should be affirmed by
decision of this Court.
The decision of the trial Court that the declaratory action
brought by Appellant to be a violation of Rule 11(b)(1) & (2) was
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established by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant's attempt
to re-litigate divorce issues barred by res judicata and in view of
the

procedural

history

of

the

divorce

action,

amounted

to

harassment of Appellee and abuse of the legal process by Appellant.
The argument advanced by Appellant that Troxel overruled the prior
decision of this Court and declared the Utah divorce statutes
unconstitutional, found to be frivolous and a violation of Rule 11
by the trial Court is supported by the clear weight of the record,
proceedings and evidence in this case.

The decision of the trial

Court should be affirmed.
Denial of Appellant's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Xudgment, not supported by the required Affidavit, was defective
md wholly insufficient, requiring denial by the trial Court within
.ts discretionary authority.

The denial of the Motion by the

rial Court was not error and should be affirmed by the decision of
his Court.
Rule 4-506 CJA is procedural and not jurisdictional.

The

listing facts clearly established there was compliance with this
lie with respect to the filing of the Rule 11 Motion in compliance
.th Rule 11 URCP.

The hearing or proceedings on the Rule 11

>tion was not held until July 30, 2001, a period of more than 4
nths after the Notice to Appoint Counsel was served, after
pellant's reply to the Motion, his appearance pro se and amended
ply to the Motion.

Appellant's claim that the Court lacked

risdiction and was barred by law from granting the Rule 11 Motion
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is unsupported and without merit and should be rejected by this
Court.
Appellee, having been awarded attorney's fees, pursuant to the
proceedings in the trial Court, warrants this Court awarding
Appellee her attorney's fees pursuant to his Appeal as a matter of
law.
Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 2002.

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Ronald C. Barker, Attorney for Appellant,
addressed to him at 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115 on this

day of November, 2002.
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DAN RODNEY JOOS,
Petitioner,
versus

PIPER C. JOOS (MONTE),
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Dan Rodney Joos, pro se petitioner
c/o Dr. Gene R. Fuller
2446 East Sabal
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone (801) 944-5870

immmak*m*mm.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

In light of Troxel v. Granville (decided June 5, 2000)
whether § 30-3-5 of the Utah Code impairs the role of fit
parents in family decisions beyond constitutional limits.

2.

Whether parental and property protections of the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment are pre-empted by
states' interest in "the marital status."

3.

Article HI of the Utah Constitution creates a unique
federal property/religion right that "shall be irrevocable
without the consent of the United States."
a.
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
state to regulate joint property of religious
parents who married the same as joint property of
cohabiting parents.
b.
When religious beliefs preclude hostility, can
states take the Father's property without
compensation by refusing to allow nonadversarial procedures?
c.
To resolve the conflict of state courts, whether
the "continuing jurisdiction" over "property"
must be interpreted the same as a "continuing
jurisdiction" over "custody, support, health and
debts."

4.

Whether determination of constitutionality of the statute
by the Utah Court of Appeals, after silencing the Father
by eliminating briefing, hearing transcripts and
argument, violates due process and First Amendment
protections of free speech
and "to petition the
government."

II

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
(The State of Utah is a party)
Dan is homeless. For years he has been without heat in
winter, sleeps on the ground and showers at truck stops because
the home and furnishings that he bought and paid for as
breadwinner belong to the state, the decision making party, to
use for the benefit of the children. The state claims to be a party
in all property and parental decisions because Piper and Dan
made a religious and responsible choice to marry rather than
have children out of wedlock.
This petition seeks to eliminate the jurisdiction of the
state as a "continuing" party over property and parental choices
of fit parents who married. Although the Court of Appeals says
in its decision, "when [the marital] status is created, the rights
involved are not merely private, but are also of public
concern....," the state should no longer be an eternal party with
unlimited power over the property and children, and should be
limited to defining and preserving marriages.
No longer should the children be "the mere creature of
the State." (Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S.
[2000] page 7)
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The U.S. marriage rate is at an all time low,
1/3 of this nation's children are born out of
wedlock and in 1998 "more than 31,000 babies
were delivered in hospitals and left there by
mothers" because state judges displace fathers
by assuming control, burden parents who
married and discriminate in favor of
cohabiting and single parents
States and the Utah Court of Appeals have
expanded states' interest in marriage into a
lifelong business regulating property and
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C.

parental decision-making of fit parents who
have broken no laws. State judiciaries cause
conflict, are unfair to fathers and have
invalidated constitutional protections of
parents who make a moral and religious
choice to marry

17

Although nearly half of the Utah Supreme
Court stepped down from the bench after
complaints were filed with the Judicial
Conduct Commission, the Court of Appeals
seeks to maintain the status quo and prevent
improved treatment of families by
circumventing the First Amendment and
limiting the father's right of appeal to merely
posing the constitutional questions the
Commission said the "appellate court" should
decide
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No.

Sntlje
Supreme Court
oftlje
WLnitzb States*
October Term, 1999
DAN RODNEY JOOS,
Petitioner,
versus
PIPER C. JOOS (MONTE),
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner respectfully requests that a writ of certiorari issue
to review the judgment, opinion and constitutional jurisdiction of the
Utah Court of Appeals.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Utah District Court did not expressly pass on the
constitutionality of the statute, leaving that duty to the appellate courts
as encouraged by the Judicial Conduct Commission; therefore, only
the opinions of the Utah Court of Appeals are in this petition.

2
The decision of the Judicial Conduct Commission is an
unpublished letter.
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals regardmg
constitutionality of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, is in form of a memorandum decision designated "not for
official publication." Similarly it's order that denied the petition for
reheanng, addressing due process and First Amendment violations, is
unpublished.
All the above decisions are reproduced in the Appendix to this
petition.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on
November 4,1999. A petition for reheanng, timely filed, was denied
on December 17, 1999. The order denying discretionary review by
the Utah Supreme Court was entered March 13, 2000.
The junsdiction of this court is mvoked under 28 U.S.C. §
1257.
The constitutionality of Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended is m question. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may apply and
shall be served on the Attorney General of Utah.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH - ARTICLE m
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of this State:
First: - Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed.
No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested m person or
property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but
polygamous or plural marnages are forever prohibited.
1896

3
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
ARTICLE VI
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
AMENDMENT I - Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT TV - The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated....
AMENDMENT V - Section l....nor shall any person....be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
AMENDMENT IX - The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
- retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X - The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT XIV - Section l....No State shall make or
enforce, any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

4
STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
Husband and Wife
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health
care of parties and children - Division of debts - Court to have
continuing jurisdiction (1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in
every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost,
an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of
the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 10. Motion for summary disposition
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on
such notice as it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review
if the court lacks jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment
or order which is the subject of review, if it plainly appears that no
substantial question is presented; or may summarily reverse in cases
of manifest error.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Like many cases, Troxel v. Granville (2000) addresses the
after-effects of broken homes. The present case gives the Supreme
Court the opportunity to change laws that cause families to fail. The
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
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Piper C. Joos,

NOV 04 1999
COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990666-CA
FILED
(November 4, 1999)

Dan Rodney Joos,
Defendant and Appellant

1999 UTApp 312

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Sandra Peuler
Attorneys: Dan Rodney Joos, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Wilkins, Bench, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Dan Rodney Joos appeals from an Order Denying
Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation.
The case is before us on Piper C. Joos' motion for summary
disposition.
Appellee first contends the appeal should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. A signed minute entry can constitute a
final appealable judgment only where it is both dispositive and
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clearly intended to serve as the final order. See Swenson Assoc.
Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994). Where, as
in the present case, the minute entry directs counsel to prepare an
order containing the court's ruling, the minute entry cannot serve
as a final appealable order. Id. The appeal was timely taken from
the final order subsequently entered on July 6,1999.
Appellee also argues that the appeal presents no
substantial question and that appellant's arguments are precluded
by res judicata. Appellant pursued a direct appeal from the
divorce decree, which resulted in affirmance of the decree.
Appellant subsequentlyfiledmotions in the district court seeking
to set aside the division of private property and force appellee to
renegotiate, to modify visitation and custody, and to declare
statutes giving the court jurisdiction over divorce proceedings
unconstitutional. Appellant also moved to have all motions
considered by the district court judge rather than the
commissioner. The relief sought by appellant was denied. We
conclude that the judgment should be summarily affirmed.
Appellant's challenge to the distribution of private
property should have been raised on direct appeal and is barred
by res judicata. Similarly, appellant's efforts to modify child
custody and visitation must be raised by a proper petition to
modify the decree that demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that
a substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the
entry of the decree. See Utah Admin. Code P. R6-404; see also
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) ("In the
absence of [a showing of substantial change of circumstances]
the decree shall not be modified and the matters previously
litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked
in the faceof the doctrine of res judicata.").
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Appellant also argues that the district court lacked
"constitutional jurisdiction"© ver the parties' divorce
proceedings. Appellant claims that the statutes pertaining to
divorce, which give the courts jurisdiction to make equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations of
the parties and granting continuing jurisdiction over these
subjects, discriminate against married persons in favor of
unmarried or cohabiting persons. Appellant's argument is
without merit. "When [the marital] status is created, the rights
involved are not merely private, but are also of public concern
insofar as they relate to the welfare of families." Neilson v.
Neilson. 780 P.2d 1264,1269 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We reject
appellant's contention that the divorce statutes are vague and
overbroad or violate equal protection guarantees.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Because appellee
was awarded attorney fees and costs below and has prevailed on
appeal, this case is remanded to the trial court for an award of the
costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred by appellee on
appeal. See Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
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Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
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